Rationale of Bank Examinations
What are the purposes of bank
examinations? Although many answers to this question could be given, several
fundamental reasons can be identified. The first relates to the maintenance of
public confidence in the integrity of the banking system and in individual
banks. Such confidence is clearly essential because the system's customers serve
as the source of funding, without which banks would be unable to meet their most
fundamental objective of providing financial services. The existence of
unhealthy or deteriorating conditions, which may threaten this integrity, should
be disclosed through the examiner's evaluation of the bank's capital adequacy,
asset quality, management, liquidity position, and earnings capacity. Second,
the periodic on-premise examination provides the best means of determining the
bank's adherence to laws and regulations. Compliance with statutory and
regulatory requirements has traditionally been given high priority by bank
supervisors, and Congress has frequently reaffirmed this posture. A third
response to the question concerns the role examinations play in protecting the
financial integrity of the deposit insurance fund. That is, the examination
process can help prevent problem situations from remaining uncorrected and
deteriorating to the point where costly financial assistance by the FDIC, or
even a payoff of depositors, becomes unavoidable. Finally, the examination
supplies the supervisor with an understanding of the nature, relative
seriousness and ultimate cause of a bank's problems, and thus provides a factual
foundation to soundly base corrective measures, recommendations and
instructions. The examination thus plays a very key role in the supervisory
process itself.
The Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System
The Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System (UFIRS) was adopted by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) on November 13, 1979. In December 1996, the FFIEC updated the UFIRS. The revised system was effective January 1, 1997. Over the years, the UFIRS has proven to be an effective internal supervisory tool for evaluating the soundness of financial institutions on a uniform basis and for identifying those institutions requiring special attention or concern. A number of changes occurred in the banking industry and in the Federal supervisory agencies' policies and procedures that prompted a review and revision of the 1979 rating system. The 1996 revisions to UFIRS include the addition of a sixth component addressing sensitivity to market risks, the explicit reference to the quality of risk management processes in the management component, and the identification of risk elements within the composite and component rating descriptions.
The UFIRS takes into consideration certain financial, managerial, and compliance factors that are common to all institutions. Under this system, the supervisory agencies endeavor to ensure that all financial institutions are evaluated in a comprehensive and uniform manner, and that supervisory attention is appropriately focused on the financial institutions exhibiting financial and operational weaknesses or adverse trends.
The UFIRS also serves as a useful vehicle for identifying problem or
deteriorating financial institutions, as well as for categorizing institutions
with deficiencies in particular component areas. Further, the rating system
assists Congress in following safety and soundness trends and in assessing the
aggregate strength and soundness of the financial industry. As such, the UFIRS
assists the agencies in fulfilling their collective mission of maintaining
stability and public confidence in the nation's financial system.
Overview
Under the UFIRS, each financial institution is assigned a composite rating based on an evaluation and rating of six essential components of an institution's financial condition and operations. These component factors address the adequacy of capital, the quality of assets, the capability of management, the quality and level of earnings, the adequacy of liquidity, and the sensitivity to market risk. Evaluations of the components take into consideration the institution's size and sophistication, the nature and complexity of its activities, and its risk profile.
Composite and component ratings are assigned based on a 1 to 5 numerical scale. A 1 indicates the highest rating, strongest performance and risk management practices, and least degree of supervisory concern, while a 5 indicates the lowest rating, weakest performance, inadequate risk management practices and, therefore, the highest degree of supervisory concern.
The composite rating generally bears a close relationship to the component ratings assigned. However, the composite rating is not derived by computing an arithmetic average of the component ratings. Each component rating is based on a qualitative analysis of the factors comprising that component and its interrelationship with the other components. When assigning a composite rating, some components may be given more weight than others depending on the situation at the institution. In general, assignment of a composite rating may incorporate any factor that bears significantly on the overall condition and soundness of the financial institution. Assigned composite and component ratings are disclosed to the institution's board of directors and senior management.
The ability of management to respond to changing circumstances and to address the risks that may arise from changing business conditions, or the initiation of new activities or products, is an important factor in evaluating a financial institution's overall risk profile and the level of supervisory attention warranted. For this reason, the management component is given special consideration when assigning a composite rating.
The ability of management to identify, measure, monitor, and control the risks of its operations is also taken into account when assigning each component rating. It is recognized, however, that appropriate management practices vary considerably among financial institutions, depending on their size, complexity, and risk profile. For less complex institutions engaged solely in traditional banking activities and whose directors and senior managers, in their respective roles, are actively involved in the oversight and management of day-to-day operations, relatively basic management systems and controls may be adequate. At more complex institutions, on the other hand, detailed and formal management systems and controls are needed to address their broader range of financial activities and to provide senior managers and directors, in their respective roles, with the information they need to monitor and direct day-to-day activities. All institutions are expected to properly manage their risks. For less complex institutions engaging in less sophisticated risk taking activities, detailed or highly formalized management systems and controls are not required to receive strong or satisfactory component or composite ratings.
Foreign Branch and specialty examination findings and the ratings assigned to those areas are taken into consideration, as appropriate, when assigning component and composite ratings under UFIRS. The specialty examination areas include: Compliance, Community Reinvestment, Government Security Dealers, Information Systems, Municipal Security Dealers, Transfer Agent, and Trust.
The following two sections contain the composite rating definitions, and the
descriptions and definitions for the six component ratings.
Composite ratings are based on a careful evaluation of an institution's
managerial, operational, financial, and compliance performance. The six key
components used to assess an institution's financial condition and operations
are: capital adequacy, asset quality, management capability, earnings quantity
and quality, the adequacy of liquidity, and sensitivity to market risk. The
rating scale ranges from 1 to 5, with a rating of 1 indicating: the strongest
performance and risk management practices relative to the institution's size,
complexity, and risk profile; and the level of least supervisory concern. A 5
rating indicates: the most critically deficient level of performance; inadequate
risk management practices relative to the institution's size, complexity, and
risk profile; and the greatest supervisory concern. The composite ratings are
defined as follows:
Financial institutions in this group are sound in every respect and generally
have components rated 1 or 2. Any weaknesses are minor and can be handled in a
routine manner by the board of directors and management. These financial
institutions are the most capable of withstanding the vagaries of business
conditions and are resistant to outside influences such as economic instability
in their trade area. These financial institutions are in substantial compliance
with laws and regulations. As a result, these financial institutions exhibit the
strongest performance and risk management practices relative to the
institution's size, complexity, and risk profile, and give no cause for
supervisory concern.
Financial institutions in this group are fundamentally sound. For a financial
institution to receive this rating, generally no component rating should be more
severe than 3. Only moderate weaknesses are present and are well within the
board of directors' and management's capabilities and willingness to correct.
These financial institutions are stable and are capable of withstanding business
fluctuations. These financial institutions are in substantial compliance with
laws and regulations. Overall risk management practices are satisfactory
relative to the institution's size, complexity, and risk profile. There are no
material supervisory concerns and, as a result, the supervisory response is
informal and limited.
Financial institutions in this group exhibit some degree of supervisory
concern in one or more of the component areas. These financial institutions
exhibit a combination of weaknesses that may range from moderate to severe;
however, the magnitude of the deficiencies generally will not cause a component
to be rated more severely than 4. Management may lack the ability or willingness
to effectively address weaknesses within appropriate time frames. Financial
institutions in this group generally are less capable of withstanding business
fluctuations and are more vulnerable to outside influences than those
institutions rated a composite 1 or 2. Additionally, these financial
institutions may be in significant noncompliance with laws and regulations. Risk
management practices may be less than satisfactory relative to the institution's
size, complexity, and risk profile. These financial institutions require more
than normal supervision, which may include formal or informal enforcement
actions. Failure appears unlikely, however, given the overall strength and
financial capacity of these institutions.
Financial institutions in this group generally exhibit unsafe and unsound
practices or conditions. There are serious financial or managerial deficiencies
that result in unsatisfactory performance. The problems range from severe to
critically deficient. The weaknesses and problems are not being satisfactorily
addressed or resolved by the board of directors and management. Financial
institutions in this group generally are not capable of withstanding business
fluctuations. There may be significant noncompliance with laws and regulations.
Risk management practices are generally unacceptable relative to the
institution's size, complexity, and risk profile. Close supervisory attention is
required, which means, in most cases, formal enforcement action is necessary to
address the problems. Institutions in this group pose a risk to the deposit
insurance fund. Failure is a distinct possibility if the problems and weaknesses
are not satisfactorily addressed and resolved.
Financial institutions in this group exhibit extremely unsafe and unsound
practices or conditions; exhibit a critically deficient performance; often
contain inadequate risk management practices relative to the institution's size,
complexity, and risk profile; and are of the greatest supervisory concern. The
volume and severity of problems are beyond management's ability or willingness
to control or correct. Immediate outside financial or other assistance is needed
in order for the financial institution to be viable. Ongoing supervisory
attention is necessary. Institutions in this group pose a significant risk to
the deposit insurance fund and failure is highly probable.
A financial institution is expected to maintain capital commensurate with the
nature and extent of risks to the institution and the ability of management to
identify, measure, monitor, and control these risks. The effect of credit,
market, and other risks on the institution's financial condition should be
considered when evaluating the adequacy of capital. The types and quantity of
risk inherent in an institution's activities will determine the extent to which
it may be necessary to maintain capital at levels above required regulatory
minimums to properly reflect the potentially adverse consequences that these
risks may have on the institution's capital.
The capital adequacy of an institution is rated based upon, but not limited
to, an assessment of the following evaluation factors:
Composite Ratings
Composite 1
Composite 2
Composite 3
Composite 4
Composite 5
Component Ratings
Each of the component rating descriptions is divided
into three sections: an introductory paragraph; a list of the principal
evaluation factors that relate to that component; and a brief description of
each numerical rating for that component. Some of the evaluation factors are
reiterated under one or more of the other components to reinforce the
interrelationship between components. The listing of evaluation factors for each
component rating is in no particular order of importance.
Capital Adequacy
Asset Quality
The asset quality rating reflects the quantity of existing and potential credit risk associated with the loan and investment portfolios, other real estate owned, and other assets, as well as off-balance sheet transactions. The ability of management to identify, measure, monitor, and control credit risk is also reflected here. The evaluation of asset quality should consider the adequacy of the allowance for loan and lease losses and weigh the exposure to counter-party, issuer, or borrower default under actual or implied contractual agreements. All other risks that may affect the value or marketability of an institution's assets, including, but not limited to, operating, market, reputation, strategic, or compliance risks, should also be considered.
The asset quality of a financial institution is rated based upon, but not limited to, an assessment of the following evaluation factors:
The capability of the board of directors and management, in their respective roles, to identify, measure, monitor, and control the risks of an institution's activities and to ensure a financial institution's safe, sound, and efficient operation in compliance with applicable laws and regulations is reflected in this rating. Generally, directors need not be actively involved in day-to-day operations; however, they must provide clear guidance regarding acceptable risk exposure levels and ensure that appropriate policies, procedures, and practices have been established. Senior management is responsible for developing and implementing policies, procedures, and practices that translate the board's goals, objectives, and risk limits into prudent operating standards.
Depending on the nature and scope of an institution's activities, management practices may need to address some or all of the following risks: credit, market, operating or transaction, reputation, strategic, compliance, legal, liquidity, and other risks. Sound management practices are demonstrated by: active oversight by the board of directors and management; competent personnel; adequate policies, processes, and controls taking into consideration the size and sophistication of the institution; maintenance of an appropriate audit program and internal control environment; and effective risk monitoring and management information systems. This rating should reflect the board's and management's ability as it applies to all aspects of banking operations as well as other financial service activities in which the institution is involved.
The capability and performance of management and the board of directors is rated based upon, but not limited to, an assessment of the following evaluation factors:
This rating reflects not only the quantity and trend of earnings, but also factors that may affect the sustainability or quality of earnings. The quantity as well as the quality of earnings can be affected by excessive or inadequately managed credit risk that may result in loan losses and require additions to the allowance for loan and lease losses, or by high levels of market risk that may unduly expose an institution's earnings to volatility in interest rates. The quality of earnings may also be diminished by undue reliance on extraordinary gains, nonrecurring events, or favorable tax effects. Future earnings may be adversely affected by an inability to forecast or control funding and operating expenses, improperly executed or ill-advised business strategies, or poorly managed or uncontrolled exposure to other risks.
The rating of an institution's earnings is based upon, but not limited to, an assessment of the following evaluation factors:
In evaluating the adequacy of a financial institution's liquidity position, consideration should be given to the current level and prospective sources of liquidity compared to funding needs, as well as to the adequacy of funds management practices relative to the institution's size, complexity, and risk profile. In general, funds management practices should ensure that an institution is able to maintain a level of liquidity sufficient to meet its financial obligations in a timely manner and to fulfill the legitimate banking needs of its community. Practices should reflect the ability of the institution to manage unplanned changes in funding sources, as well as react to changes in market conditions that affect the ability to quickly liquidate assets with minimal loss. In addition, funds management practices should ensure that liquidity is not maintained at a high cost, or through undue reliance on funding sources that may not be available in times of financial stress or adverse changes in market conditions.
Liquidity is rated based upon, but not limited to, an assessment of the following evaluation factors:
The sensitivity to market risk component reflects the degree to which changes in interest rates, foreign exchange rates, commodity prices, or equity prices can adversely affect a financial institution's earnings or economic capital. When evaluating this component, consideration should be given to: management's ability to identify, measure, monitor, and control market risk; the institution's size; the nature and complexity of its activities; and the adequacy of its capital and earnings in relation to its level of market risk exposure.
For many institutions, the primary source of market risk arises from nontrading positions and their sensitivity to changes in interest rates. In some larger institutions, foreign operations can be a significant source of market risk. For some institutions, trading activities are a major source of market risk.
Market risk is rated based upon, but not limited to, an assessment of the following evaluation factors:
It is the FDIC's view that disclosure of the CAMELS component and composite ratings to bank management is appropriate. The broad range of financial products offered through the financial services industry magnifies the importance of sound risk management policies and procedures. In this environment, the examination process is incomplete if it focuses solely on the institution's current financial condition, and fails to assess its ability to identify and adapt to changing economic, competitive, and other factors. Disclosure of the component and composite ratings encourages a more complete and open discussion of examination findings and recommendations, and therefore provides management with useful information to assist in making risk management procedures more effective.
Additionally, open discussion of the CAMELS component ratings provides
institutions with a better understanding of how ratings are derived, and enables
management to better address any weaknesses in specific areas.
Discussions With Management
The examiner-in-charge should discuss the recommended component and composite ratings with senior management, and when appropriate the board of directors, at the conclusion of the examination. Examiners should clearly explain that the ratings are tentative and subject to final approval by the Regional Director.
Examiners should discuss the factors they considered when assigning the component and composite ratings. Examiners should also indicate that the composite rating is not based on a numerical average, but rather that it is based on a qualitative evaluation of an institution's overall managerial, operational, and financial performance.
The rating of the management component will be particularly sensitive and important. The quality of management is often the single most important element in the successful operation of an insured institution, and is usually the factor that is most indicative of how well risk is identified, measured, monitored, and controlled. For this reason, examiners should thoroughly review and explain the factors considered when assigning the management rating. Written comments in support of the management rating should include an assessment of the effectiveness of existing policies and procedures in identifying, monitoring, and managing risk.
Finally, management should be reminded that the composite and component ratings, whether disclosed verbally or in the written report of examination, are subject to the confidentiality rules imposed by Part 309 of the FDIC's Rules and Regulations.
Examination Priorities and Frequency Criteria
The Division's first priority is the effective surveillance and supervision of banks requiring special supervisory attention. The examination process best accomplishes identification of those banks. Section 10(d) of the FDI Act requires annual full-scope examinations for all depository institutions, including insured bank affiliates of multi-bank holding companies and insured branches of foreign banks. Annual examination intervals may be extended to 18 months under the following conditions:
The Division strives to provide safety and soundness and specialty
examinations of all state nonmember banks within prescribed intervals. If
examination frequency requirements, other than a few nominal and non-recurring
exceptions, can not be met, a memorandum should be prepared and submitted to the
Director of the Division of Supervision. The memorandum should include a
description of the nature and cause of the situation and a description of any
needed, planned, or implemented corrective measures designed to maintain an
adequate supervision program.
Alternate Examinations
Examinations may be conducted in alternate 12 (or 18) month periods if the FDIC determines that a full-scope, on-site examination completed by the appropriate state supervisory authority during the interim period is acceptable. However, such alternate examinations should be accepted only for the following institutions: composite 1- or 2-rated institutions; and for stable and improving composite 3-rated institutions if the composite rating is confirmed by the CAEL off-site monitoring system and no adverse trends are noted from other available information. The length of time between the end of one examination and the start of the next (whether one or both of the examinations are conducted by a state supervisory agency or the FDIC) should not exceed 12 (or 18) months.
For purposes of monitoring compliance with examination frequency schedules,
the end of the examination is defined as the earlier of the date the report is
submitted for review or 60 calendar days from the Examination Start Date
as defined in the Report of Examination Instructions.
Full - Scope Examinations
The minimum requirements of a full-scope
examination are defined as the procedures necessary to complete the core pages
of the uniform report of examination and evaluate all components of the CAMELS
rating system. The completion of additional steps and pages may often be
appropriate.
Limited Scope Examinations And Visitations
Visitations and limited
scope examinations do not satisfy the requirements of Section 10(d) of the FDI
Act. Visitations and limited scope examinations have a flexible format and may
be used to: (1) determine changes in an institution's risk profile; (2) monitor
compliance with a corrective program; (3) comply with CAEL follow-up
requirements and to investigate adverse or unusual situations; (4) determine
progress in correcting deficiencies noted at the previous examination; (5) act
as an investigative and supervisory tool; and (6) comply with schedules
described under Other Situations below.
Limited scope examinations or visitations may address the overall condition of the institution including material changes since the previous examination and areas that exhibit more than normal risk. Depending on the focus of the scope and the purpose of the examination or visitation, examiners can assign composite ratings as well as component ratings for areas that were sufficiently reviewed. Component ratings that were not reviewed should be carried forward from the previous examination.
Completion of the standard examination report form is not required although
appropriate report pages may be included if considered necessary to clarify a
finding or recommendation. Results should generally be conveyed in a memorandum
from the examiner-in-charge to the Regional Director. If the examination or
visitation results are to be sent to the institution, they can be in whatever
form (letter or other suitable format) is considered appropriate.
Other Situations
In addition to the preceding instructions, examinations should be performed
in the following situations:
Newly Chartered And Insured Institutions
If the institution is a
subsidiary of a multibank holding company that is in satisfactory condition, the
normal examination cycle should be followed; otherwise, a limited scope
examination should be conducted within the first six months of operation, and a
full-scope examination within the first twelve months of operation. Subsequent
to the first examination and through the third year of operation, at least one
examination should be performed each year. Extended examination intervals should
not be applied in the first three years of operation. Subsequent to the initial
full-scope examination, examinations may be alternated with the state
supervisory authority if circumstances permit.
Institutions Converting to Insured Nonmember Status
A full-scope
examination should be conducted within twelve months of the last examination
prior to conversion for national, state member and thrift institutions. For
noninsured institutions converting to insured status, a full-scope examination
should be conducted within twelve months of the FDIC entrance examination. A
limited scope examination or visitation should be considered within three months
of conversion, especially in banks that have not had an FDIC entrance
examination.
Change Of Ownership Control
If the FDIC's knowledge of the new
ownership reflects satisfactory financial and management performance, standard
examination intervals should apply. If new ownership is unknown, a limited scope
examination should be conducted within the first six months of the change of
ownership control, and a full-scope examination should be conducted within
twelve months after the change. Thereafter, standard examination intervals
apply.
Institutions that have received FDIC assistance, or been involved in
purchase and assumption or deposit transfer transactions
Acquiring
institutions with total assets in excess of ten times the deposits acquired,
which are rated composite 2 or better, and which have an acceptable CAEL DIFF
score are exempt from the following requirements. State nonmember institutions:
a visitation or limited scope examination should be conducted within 30 days of
the date of the transaction to determine how funds from the FDIC are being used
and whether the bank is in accordance with any applicable assistance agreement.
A second visitation or limited scope examination should be conducted within six
months of the transaction. A full-scope examination should be conducted within
twelve months of the transaction. Thereafter, standard examination frequency
schedules apply. A cooperative program should be established with the
appropriate Federal agency for national, state member, and thrift institutions,
to ensure that all institutions receiving FDIC funds are properly monitored and
that the FDIC Regional Director is informed of important developments.
Coordination With State Authorities
Every effort should be made to coordinate examination schedules with state authorities to take advantage of state resources, to minimize duplications of effort, and to lessen business disruptions to the institutions. A representative of the Regional Office should meet with representatives from each state banking authority to determine examination responsibilities for the upcoming year. Responsibilities may be defined in broad categories by rating, size and location of institutions, or may be done by specific institution as deemed appropriate. Such agreements should contain enough flexibility to allow either party to alter schedules with minimal notice.
While state examination requirements should be considered in the coordination
process, statutory requirements should not be the determining factor in the
final agreement.
Examinations of the subsidiaries of holding company organizations with
consolidated assets over $10 billion, and those banking organizations
(generally, with assets in excess of $1 billion) that exhibit financial
weakness, should be coordinated with other Federal agencies.
Examinations and inspections of insured subsidiary banks and bank holding
companies that do not meet the foregoing criteria should be coordinated to the
extent practical and where resources permit. Regional Directors (or designees)
should meet periodically with representatives from other Federal agencies to
develop coordinated schedules that will maximize the use of examination
resources and enhance the efficiency of bank and bank holding company
examinations. The coordination of examinations should focus on the use of common
financial statement dates, where possible, and allow for joint discussions of
examination findings with management. However, absolute concurrence, common
As of dates, or simultaneous starting dates are not required. Appropriate
state regulatory agencies should also be kept informed and encouraged to
participate in the coordinated Federal efforts affecting state banks.
Examinations of nonbank affiliates may be conducted at the discretion of the
Regional Director, but independent examinations of holding companies supervised
by the Federal Reserve may not be conducted without prior approval of the
Washington Office.
A coordinated supervisory strategy for interstate banking organizations (both
intra- and inter-regional) should be developed. The supervisory strategy
developed should combine traditional supervision of individual units with an
appropriate top-down approach to assess risk and to monitor and coordinate
supervisory actions. For these organizations, the Regional Director has
discretion to omit, delay or modify existing examination frequency policies if:
(1) the financial condition of the holding company and lead bank is considered
satisfactory; (2) the condition of the subsidiary units is believed to be
satisfactory; (3) control over all insured banks in the organization is
effectively centralized; and (4) management is favorably regarded.
Regional Directors are responsible for: (a) designating a lead Region to
design an appropriate supervisory strategy for interstate banking organizations;
and (b) ensuring pertinent information is conveyed in a timely manner to other
DOS Regions and to appropriate Federal and State agencies.
It is the policy of the Division to monitor and supervise banks that are part
of a chain banking organization in a manner that fully considers the financial
impact of the consolidated chain on the individual institutions within that
chain. Regional Directors are responsible for maintaining a record system for
chain banking organizations and for developing an overall supervisory strategy
for those organizations.
Specialty examinations should generally be conducted concurrently with safety
and soundness examinations, except when the size or arrangement of the
department makes it impractical or inefficient to do so. Specialty examinations
(including IS, trust, registered transfer agent, government securities
brokers/dealers, municipal securities broker/dealers, and BSA) are generally
subject to the same examination intervals, including appropriate extensions, as
safety and soundness examinations.
Regional Directors can make reasonable adjustments to specialty examination
intervals to accommodate concurrent examinations in situations where rating
differences or alternate state examinations result in examination intervals that
are not conducive to scheduling concurrent examinations. Reasonable adjustments
include extending the examination cycle for 1-, 2-, or 3-rated specialty areas.
Specialty areas rated 4 or 5 should normally not be extended beyond a one-year
interval. Additionally, since Municipal Securities Dealers are subject to a
two-year examination cycle under Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board rules,
any adjustment in this area should not exceed the two-year requirement. The
possibility of conducting specialty examinations with state authorities should
be explored if reasonable adjustments can be made.
When the state supervisory authority has examination responsibility for the
safety and soundness examination of an institution, it will not be the
responsibility of the region to conduct any specialty examinations that are not
conducted by the state supervisory authority in order to maintain compliance
with the requirements of section 10(d) of the FDI Act.
The same priorities and frequency of examinations including instructions
regarding other situations that are applicable to domestic FDIC supervised
institutions are applicable to insured branches of foreign banks.
Periodic on-site examinations are critical to the supervisory process and are
an integral part of the examination program. Diversified risks in the industry
and the volatile performance and financial condition of individual institutions
necessitate emphasis on more frequent and less structured supervision.
Investigations, phone calls, limited scope examinations, correspondence and
other forms of customized contact should be made as necessary. The purpose is to
identify and obtain corrections in an institution's policies and procedures
before serious financial problems develop.
Pre-examination activities should include efforts to determine the activities
engaged in and the condition of nonbank subsidiaries. If not determinable in
advance, this should be conducted early in the examination in order to assess
the necessity of and depth of examination of subsidiaries.
The success of this effort depends largely on the effectiveness of assignment
scheduling and preordination. Examiner resources should be allocated and
directed based on the best information available as to potential problems
without over emphasizing the mere passage of time.
A prospective supervisory approach, entailing criticism of policies and
practices before unsafe and unsound conditions actually develop calls for
serious thought and studied reaction by examiners. Critical comments must be
well supported and based on logic, prudent banking standards, and the potential
for harm. In questionable circumstances where formal action is a possibility,
examiners should consult with the Regional Office while the examination is in
progress regarding the material needed to support a potential action.
Moreover, a formal examination may not be the most efficient use of resources
in investigating the risk potential a bank may present. The objective is to
assess the problem and, if necessary, devise a solution in the quickest, most
efficient manner possible. Frequently, a telephone call or brief on-site visit
may suffice. Sometimes such preliminary efforts will indicate that a full-scope
examination is appropriate.
In order for all available information to be considered, it is critical that
the Field Office Supervisor and other appropriate personnel be aware of and have
access to the scheduling process. Regional Directors should ensure that copies
of relevant correspondence and other pertinent information are made available.
Procedures should ensure that information that may affect scheduling decisions
is documented and made available to the involved personnel. Individuals doing
scheduling must review and consider this information.
Because of the variety of sources and forms of relevant information
available, it is not possible to design a uniform system of information
gathering and reporting. However, the list below includes some information that
may come to the FDIC's attention and have an influence in prioritizing
assignments. Some of these items, such as involvement in FDIC assistance
transactions, have supervisory schedules specified in our policy. Others are
merely information that, in and of themselves, may or may not raise a concern
depending on what else is known about the bank. However, these or similar items
may give a signal that requires further follow-up. Such clues should not be
ignored. The list, while not all inclusive, indicates a need for supervision to
be anticipatory and provides a reminder of some of the common sources of
information that may warrant consideration when scheduling.
Effective bank supervision entails the continual assimilation of information
from numerous sources, both within and outside the FDIC. The appropriate
response, if any, depends on the circumstances, supervisory action already
underway, what is known about the institution, and what can be learned from
follow-up procedures. In some instances, the information serves as a"red flag,"
leading to an immediate examination. In less severe situations, the information
is retained and factored into the process of scheduling future examinations. It
is possible that a given piece of information can be derived from more than one
source. Thus, some of the items listed below are included under more than one
source.
Coordination of Bank Holding Company Inspections and Subsidiary Institution
Examinations
Supervision of Interstate Banking Organizations and Chain Banks
Specialty Examination Intervals
Insured Branches Of Foreign Banks
Anticipatory Supervision
To effectively prevent serious problems in
an institution, the conditions and circumstances that may lead to problems must
be identified and corrected early. Corrective action should be taken immediately
upon identifying excessive risk taking. History has taught that when corrective
action is not taken until conditions have deteriorated, it is often too late to
avoid failure. Moral suasion and informal agreements are normally sufficient
where the unacceptable risk-taking is identified early, but formal action must
be considered, even when an institution is rated 1 or 2, if circumstances
warrant.
Scheduling Process
A goal of examinations of 1 and 2-rated
institutions is to correct weaknesses before they cause serious difficulties and
become a financial risk to the FDIC. Therefore, it is far more important to
examine, or otherwise supervise, a bank if there is some reason to suspect a
problem than if the bank merely has not been examined in a specified period of
time.
Information to Consider in Scheduling Examinations
Offsite Analysis And Monitoring
Applications, Notices or Other Bank Provided Data
Known Characteristics
Examinations Of Other Banks
Other Bank Regulators
Guidelines For Relying On State Examinations
Section 349 of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 requires the FFIEC to issue guidelines establishing standards for the purpose of determining the acceptability of state reports of examination under Section 10(d)(3) of the FDI Act. Under Section 10(d)(3), a Federal banking agency may conduct an annual, on-site examination of an insured depository institution in alternate 12 (or 18) month periods if the agency determines that a state examination conducted during the intervening period is adequate. The standards issued by the FFIEC are to be used at the discretion of the appropriate Federal banking agency.
The supervisory divisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Office of Thrift Supervision (Federal banking agencies) responsible for the examination of state-chartered, insured depository institutions, and the branches and agencies of foreign banks that have been chartered by the states have a long history of coordinating with the state banking departments in fulfilling a mutual goal of promoting a safe and sound banking system. It is recognized that this close cooperation between the Federal and State regulators promotes efficiency in the examination process, reduces the regulatory burden on state-chartered, insured depository institutions, and improves the supervisory process.
The Federal and State banking agencies have worked together, to varying degrees, in the following areas:
The FDIC intends to continue these cooperative efforts to the maximum extent possible. It is recognized, however, that the adequacy of state budgeting, examiner staffing, and training are important factors to enhancing Federal and State coordination. The FDIC has entered into formal and informal arrangements or working agreements with most state banking departments. These working agreements or informal arrangements generally address the following areas:
These working agreements or informal arrangements are structured to permit both Federal and State agencies the flexibility to conduct an independent examination subject only to notification to the other party. Generally, only institutions rated"1" or"2" are examined on an alternating basis allowing for a reasonable interval between examinations.
A hallmark of a successful program has been the flexibility to tailor
cooperation to the particulars of each state and to the specifics of individual
banks within a state, plus the reality of changing circumstances at both the
Federal and State levels. The FFIEC guidelines strive to maintain that
flexibility.
The FDIC will accept and rely on state reports of examination in all cases in
which it is determined that state examinations enable the FDIC to effectively
carry out its supervisory responsibilities. The following criteria may be
considered, in whole or in part, when determining the acceptability of a state
report of examination under Section 10(d) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act:
The FDIC, as part of its routine review of state examination reports, will
assess the quality and scope of the reports to determine whether they continue
to meet the above general criteria. The FDIC retains the option in cases in
which a state examination report appears insufficient or the condition of an
insured institution, as indicated in the examination report or other sources,
appears to be seriously deteriorating, to conduct a follow-up examination.
The FDIC and state banking departments will share, discuss and work to
resolve any problems or concerns regarding the acceptability of each other's
work or the operation of these guidelines and the alternating examination
program, as well as other issues of mutual interest.
Thorough pre-examination planning is critical to the efficient completion of
an examination. Pre-examination planning can help set scope decisions in terms
of work to be performed and areas to receive special attention. It can also help
determine staffing needs in regards to the number and expertise of personnel
required. Finally, it can enhance the general orderliness and efficiency of an
examination.
Part of the pre-planning process should also address the need for, or extent
of, branch examinations. It is the FDIC's practice to examine the various
offices of a branch banking system on an as-needed basis only. Such decisions
are within the province of the Regional Director or may be delegated by the
Regional Director to the Field Office Supervisor or examiner-in-charge of a
particular examination.
As a general rule, bankers should be given at least two weeks notice of an
upcoming safety and soundness examination in order to provide them with enough
time to complete pre-examination requests. A shorter period is permissible if
the institution is not unduly burdened or if a shorter period is occasionally
needed due to planning requirements. Exceptions to this general policy may
include problem institutions, situations where management and ownership of the
institution are identical, or in situations where conditions are deteriorating
rapidly.
Examiners should make every effort to conduct as many pre-, post- and other
examination procedures as reasonably possible off-site in order to minimize
disruptions to an institution's normal business activities. Additionally,
examiners should be mindful of an institution's space and personnel limitations
and schedule the number of examiners working on bank premises accordingly.
An examination procedures module titled Risk Scoping Activities is
included in the Examination Modules Handbook. This module identifies and lists
several activities to be completed by examiners during the pre-examination
process. Refer to this module for additional guidance.
Ongoing communication between the examination staff and bank management is a
critical element of effective bank supervision. Open communication helps to
ensure that examination requests are met and that disruptions to an
institution's normal course of business are minimized.
Pre-planning meetings designed to coordinate examination activities should
address information requests (including the names of contact individuals), work
space plans, and the general scope of the examination. Other informal meetings
should be held as needed throughout the examination to discuss various topics,
and to gain management's perspective on local economic and bank-specific
conditions and concerns. Prior to the conclusion of the examination, examiners
should thoroughly discuss their findings and recommendations with senior
management. Such meetings provide an opportunity for management to respond to
examiner findings and recommendations and to clarify policies and procedures.
The following examples represent situations that will prompt meetings and
encourage dialogue between examiners and management during the course of an
examination. The circumstances of each examination will determine the type and
number of meetings that will be necessary, as well as the degree of formality
required to schedule and conduct the meetings.
Regardless of the number or type of meetings held, it is critical that
examiners ensure that on-going two-way communication takes place. Such
communication allows both parties to freely exchange information, and enhances
the effectiveness of the examination process.
When it is concluded that a meeting with a board committee rather than the
full board is appropriate, selection of the committee must be based on the
group's actual responsibilities and functions rather than its title. In all
cases, the committee chosen should include an acceptable representation of board
members who are not full time officers.
The success of the board meeting is highly dependent upon the examiner's
preparation. A written agenda that lists all areas to be discussed and provides
supporting documents or schedules will usually be worthwhile as a means of
assisting in the explanation of certain aspects of the examination. Failure to
adequately prepare for the meeting may substantially diminish the supervisory
value of the examination.
To encourage awareness and participation on the part of board members,
examiners should inform bank management that the examination report (or copies
thereof) should be made available to each director for thorough and timely
review and that a signature page is included in the examination report to be
signed by each director after review of the report. Management should also be
reminded the report is confidential, remains the property of the FDIC, and that
utmost care should be exercised in its reproduction and distribution. The bank
should be advised to retrieve, destroy and record the fact of destruction of any
reproduced copies when they have served their purpose.
Effective risk management has always been central to safe and sound banking
activities and it has become more important as new technologies, product
innovation, and the size and speed of financial transactions have changed the
nature of banking markets. The objective of a risk-focused examination is to
effectively evaluate the safety and soundness of the bank, including the
assessment of risk management systems, financial condition, and compliance with
applicable laws and regulations, while focusing resources on the bank's highest
risks. The exercise of examiner judgement to determine the depth of review in
each functional area is crucial to the success of the risk-focused supervisory
process.
Examination procedure modules have been developed jointly by the FDIC and the
Federal Reserve to provide examiners with a tool to focus on risk management and
establish an appropriate examination scope. The modules incorporate questions
and points of consideration into examination procedures to specifically address
a bank's risk management strategies for each of its major business activities.
The modules direct examiners to consider areas of potential risk and associated
risk control practices, thereby facilitating an effective supervisory program.
The guidelines set forth standards or "best practices" and the risks associated
with not meeting the standards.
Examination procedures are separated into three distinct tiers: Core
Analysis; Expanded Analysis; and Impact Analysis. The extent to which an
examiner works through each of these levels of analysis depends upon conclusions
reached regarding the presence of significant concerns or deficiencies. The
modules are contained in a separate Examination Modules Handbook.
The most effective and efficient examination approach focuses examiner
resources on validating bank management's ability to identify, measure, monitor,
and control risks. Internal audits, external audits, loan review, and other
control activities are integral to a bank's own assessment of its risk profile.
Examiners should consider the adequacy of these functions in determining the
risk profile of the bank and the opportunities to reduce regulatory burden by
testing rather than duplicating the work of these audit and control functions.
Transaction testing remains a reliable and essential examination technique for
use in the assessment of a bank's condition. The amount of transaction testing
necessary to evaluate particular activities generally depends on the quality of
the bank's process to identify, measure, monitor, and control the risks in the
banking activity. Once the integrity of the management system is verified
through testing, conclusions on the extent of risks within the activity can be
based on the internal management system rather than on evaluating the potential
risk to the bank.
Where significant deficiencies or weaknesses are noted in the core analysis
review, the examiner will be required to complete the Expanded Analysis section
but only for those decision factors that present the greatest degree of risk to
the bank. On the other hand, if the risks are properly managed, the examiner can
conclude the review after documenting conclusions concerning the Core Analysis
Decision Factors and carry any comments to the Report of Examination. The
Expanded Analysis section provides guidance to the examiner in determining if
weaknesses are material to the bank's condition and if the activity is
adequately managed.
Examiners are required to document the Expanded Analysis Decision Factors. If
the risks are material or the activity is inadequately managed, the examiner is
directed to perform an Impact Analysis to assess the financial impact to the
bank and assess whether any enforcement action is necessary.
The use of the modules should be tailored to the characteristics of each bank
based on its size, complexity, and risk profile. As a result, the extent to
which each module is completed will vary from bank to bank. Individual
procedures presented for each level are meant only to serve as a guide for
answering the decision factors. Each procedure does not require an individual
response; however, the automation allows for notes under each procedure.
Examiners are required to document their responses to both the Core Analysis
Decision Factors and the Expanded Analysis Decision Factors.
As stated earlier, the primary purpose of this manual is to provide policy
guidance and direction to the field examiner that may then be applied in the
safety and soundness examination process. Policy manuals or other instructional
materials pertaining to other areas of examination interest, such as trust
department operations, information systems (IS) activities, transfer agent and
consumer compliance, have also been developed. Those areas were not included in
this manual simply to enhance the organization of the material, keep the
document reasonable in length, and thereby maximize its usefulness. However,
exclusion of these topics in no way implies that these activities are not of
interest to the safety and soundness examination. To the contrary, deficiencies
in these other aspects of a bank's operations can have a major impact on the
institution's overall soundness. Therefore, it is critical for the examiner to
be aware of the existence and significance of any deficiencies in these other
areas. Separate examination reports or schedules have been designed to evaluate
these functions, and it is the Corporation's policy that such examinations
generally should be conducted concurrently with the safety and soundness review.
Some exceptions to this concurrent examination preference are permitted and are
detailed in the instructions pertaining to these specialty areas.
To emphasize and illustrate how weaknesses in these ancillary activities can
adversely affect the whole bank, a brief overview of trust, EDP and compliance
operations is provided.
In order to perform their duties properly, examiners must be knowledgeable of
the principles, policies and practices contained in the aforementioned handbooks
on EDP, compliance, trust and others. There are other reference sources also
very relevant to the examination process and with which it is essential for the
examiner to become familiar. These include the body of state laws and
regulations which apply to the bank being examined; the rules, regulations,
statements of policy and various banking-related statutes contained in the
Prentice-Hall volumes; and the instructions for completion of the Consolidated
Report of Condition and the Consolidated Report of Income. The last mentioned
source is the principal reference for balance sheet and income statement
presentation of various transactions and accounts in both the foregoing Reports
and the Report of Examination.
The report of examination is highly confidential. Although a copy is provided
to the bank, that copy remains the property of the FDIC. Without the FDIC's
prior authorization, directors, officers, employees and agents of a bank are not
permitted to disclose the contents of a report. Under specified circumstances,
FDIC regulations permit disclosures by a bank to its parent holding company or
majority shareholder.
FDIC regulations do not prohibit employees or agents of a bank from reviewing
the report of examination if it is necessary for purposes of their employment.
Accountants and attorneys acting in their capacities as bank"employees" or
agents may review an examination report without prior FDIC approval, but only
insofar as it relates to their scope of employment. The Division believes the
definition of"agent" includes an accountant or accounting firm which performs an
audit of the bank.
Reports of examination are routinely provided to the bank's chartering
authority. Therefore, state bank examiners may review the bank's copy of an FDIC
examination during a state examination.
Workpapers should be a written trail of decisions and supporting logic that
also indicate individual responsibility. They should provide written support for
examination and verification procedures performed and the assertions of fact or
opinion in the financial schedules and narrative comments in the report of
examination.
All procedures performed during the examination should be sufficiently
documented in the workpapers. All workpapers should be labeled with the
institution's name and location, dated, and signed or initialed by the examiner
or assistant examiner who prepared the document. Examiners should include in the
workpapers a summary of procedures performed at each examination. The use and
completion of the Examination Procedure Modules meet this workpaper
documentation requirement.
This documentation should be prepared and retained in the workpapers for all
job assignments regardless of whether the assignment involved an examination
report page or a disclosed problem. The workpapers for each assignment should
include a brief summary of the procedures performed and the basis for the
conclusion reached. This requirement is satisfied by use of the Examination
Modules deciGuidelines for Relying on State Examinations
Examiner Meetings with Bank Management
Meetings With Directors
In order to encourage director involvement
in and enhance director awareness of the FDIC's supervisory efforts and to
increase the effectiveness of such efforts, policies have been established
governing meetings with bank boards of directors. The bank's composite rating is
the single most important variable in the decision as to if and when these
meetings should be held. Specifics of the Division's policies are detailed
below.
Banks Assigned or Likely to be Assigned a Composite "4" or "5"
Rating
The examiner-in-charge and the Regional Director or designee should
meet with the board of directors (with the required quorum in attendance) during
or subsequent to the examination. Additional meetings or other contacts with the
board of directors or appropriate board committee may be scheduled at the
Regional Director's discretion.
Banks Assigned or Likely to be Assigned a Composite "3" Rating
The
examiner-in-charge should meet with the board (with the required quorum in
attendance) during or subsequent to the examination. Regional Office
representation is at the discretion of the Regional Director. Additional
meetings or other contacts with the board of directors or appropriate board
committee may be scheduled at the discretion of the Regional Director or
designee.
Banks Assigned or Likely to be Assigned a Composite Rating of "1" or "2"
The examiner-in-charge will meet with the board or a board committee during
or subsequent to the examination when: 36 months or more have elapsed since the
last such meeting; the management component of the CAMELS rating is "3", "4" or
"5"; any other CAMELS performance rating is "4" or "5"; or any two performance
ratings are "3", "4" or "5". It is important to note that meeting with a board
committee (in lieu of the entire board) in conjunction with an examination is
permissible only when the committee is influential as to policy, meets
regularly, contains reasonable outside director representation and reports
regularly to the entire board. Other factors that may be relevant to the
decision of whether or not to hold a board meeting include recent changes in
control ownership and/or top management, economic conditions, request by
management for a meeting and any unique conditions or trends pertinent to the
institution. Regional Office participation in meetings with composite-rated "1"
or "2" banks is at the Regional Director's discretion.
Other Considerations
When a meeting is held in conjunction with an
examination, the names of board and/or committee members in attendance should be
included on the Examination Conclusions and Comments schedule. A clear but
concise presentation of the items covered at the meeting, including corrective
commitments and/or reactions of management, should also be indicated. If the
meeting is held, but not in conjunction with an examination, a summary of the
meeting should be prepared and a copy mailed to the institution, via certified
mail, for consideration by the board and inclusion in the official minutes of
the directorate's next meeting. As above, this meeting summary should include
the names of attendees and the corrective commitments and/or reactions of
management.
Examination Program
Risk Focused Supervision
Examination Modules
Other Sources of Examination Information and Policy Guidance
Trust Department
A bank's trust department acts in a fiduciary
capacity when the business it transacts, or the money or property it handles, is
not its own or for its own benefit but belongs to and is for the benefit of
others. This type of relationship clearly necessitates a great deal of
confidence on the part of the bank's customers and demands a high degree of good
faith and responsibility on the part of the bank. The primary objective of the
trust department examination is to determine whether its operations or the
administration of its accounts have given rise to possible or contingent
liabilities, or direct liabilities (called estimated losses), which would reduce
the bank's capital accounts. If the terms of trust instruments are violated, if
relevant laws and regulations are not complied with, or if generally accepted
fiduciary standards are not adhered to, the department, and hence the bank, may
become liable and suffer losses. Obviously, if the magnitude of these losses is
sufficient, the viability of the bank may be threatened. To aid the examiner in
evaluating the trust department, an interagency rating system has been devised.
Composite ratings of "1" (highest level of performance) through "5" (most
critically deficient level of performance) may be assigned, based on analysis of
six critical areas of the department's administration and operations.
Electronic Data Processing
Electronic data processing is now applied
to numerous recordkeeping and operational areas in banks. These EDP services may
be provided by the bank's own in-house computer system or the institution may
arrange to have another financial institution or independent data center perform
these functions. As banks' reliance on the computer has increased, the potential
consequences of receiving faulty data or suffering an interruption in EDP
services have become much more serious. Thus, the need has arisen for
comprehensive EDP examination policies and procedures. A primary objective of
the EDP examination is to determine the validity and reliability of the records
produced by the automated system; therefore, the emphasis is on an evaluation of
internal controls. Data processing operations are rated by the EDP examiner in
accordance with a uniform interagency rating system based on an evaluation of
four critical functions audit; management; systems development and programming;
and computer operations. The data center composite or summary rating is
predicated upon the separate performance ratings assigned these four functions.
A scale of "1" through "5" is used, wherein "1" indicates strong performance and
"5" denotes hazardous performance.
Compliance
This term has become synonymous with those examinations
that have as their principal objective the determination of a bank's adherence
to various consumer protection and civil rights laws and regulations. These
various statutes or regulations include, but are not limited to, Truth in
Lending, Truth in Savings, the Community Reinvestment Act and Fair Housing.
Noncompliance with these regulatory restrictions and standards may result in an
injustice to the individual(s) affected and reflects adversely on the
capabilities of the institution's management. Moreover, violations of the
consumer laws can entail civil liability in many cases and criminal liability in
some. If significant in amount, such losses could conceivably have an adverse
financial impact on the bank. As is the case for EDP and trust operations, an
interagency rating system for consumer compliance has been designed. It provides
a general framework for evaluating the institution's present conformance with
consumer protection and civil rights laws and regulations except for the
Community Reinvestment Act and for assessing the adequacy of its operating
systems to ensure continued compliance. A numbering scheme of "1" through "5" is
used with"1" signifying the best performance and "5" the worst. A separate
examination rating is assigned to each institution based on its performance in
the area of community reinvestment. The four ratings are outstanding,
satisfactory, needs to improve, and substantial noncompliance.
Disclosure of Reports of Examination
Examination Workpapers
Introduction
Substance of Workpapers